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Case No. 20160995-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

CHRISTOPHER KIM LEECH,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Christopher Leech organized and carried out the
kidnapping, robbery, and murder of a man who was late returning a car after
a drug deal. One of Leech’s two accomplices testified against him at the joint
preliminary hearing of Leech and two co-defendants. Three different defense
attorneys cross-examined the accomplice at that hearing, with Leech’s
counsel asking the bulk of the questions. At Leech’s trial, the accomplice
refused to testify, and the trial court admitted his preliminary hearing
testimony over Leech’s objection.
Leech argues that admitting this testimony violated rule 804 as
interpreted in State v. Goins. Goins held that in all but the rarest of cases,

defense counsel does not have the same motive to cross-examine at a
preliminary hearing that they have at trial.
This is the rare case in which counsel’s motive to cross-examine at the
preliminary hearing was sufficiently similar to the motive at trial that this
Court should hold that the testimony was admissible. But even if the
testimony were inadmissible, its admission was harmless, given the other
evidence of Leech’s guilt.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court correctly decide that an accomplice’s extensively
cross-examined preliminary hearing testimony was admissible at trial?
Standard of Review. The correct interpretation of an evidence rule is a
question of law; the admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
State v. Lowther, 2017 UT 34, ¶17, 398 P.3d 1032.
2. Can Leech prevail under a cumulative-error theory when he alleges
only a single error?
Standard of Review. None applies.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of relevant facts.1
Andrew Beck (Andy) and Cleat Knight sat on a snow-covered
embankment—hands tied, heads fully hooded—held at gunpoint by
Defendant Christopher Leech, Theron Moore (TJ), and Viliamu Seumanu
(Juice).2 R1877-80, 1883, 1891, 1903. After someone removed their hoods,
Cleat looked at Andy and said, “Sorry, bro, I guess this is it.” R1896. For Cleat,
it was—Leech immediately shot him in the back. Id. Thinking “’[t]his is it” for
him too, Andy “tensed up and stared off ahead,” just “waiting to get shot.”
R1898. But after a few suspenseful minutes, someone cut his hands free. Id.
Leech then stood Andy up and handed him a gun with a single bullet
in the chamber. R1900-01. As Leech held another gun to Andy’s head, he said,
“There is your homeboy”; “Now you got a choice. You can either finish him
or you’re next.” R1899, 2004. After some deliberation and one unsuccessful
attempt, Andy complied, shooting his “best friend” Cleat. R1829, 1901-02.
***

Consistent with appellate standards, the State recites the facts in the
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶46, 326
P.3d 645.
1

Seumanu’s appeal is also before this Court. See State v. Seumanu, Case
No. 20150593-CA.
2
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Andy and Cleat had been close for more than twenty years. R1829. Both
they and those they associated with used and sold drugs. R1830. One day,
Andy got a call from Tina Soules, a former girlfriend. R1821, 1833. Tina
wanted Andy to pick up some methamphetamine for her, because he could
get it cheaper. R1833. He agreed, and Tina brought him a rental car and cash
for the job. Id.; see also SE13 (rental car).
Andy went to his supplier, but got only half of the requested amount.
R1834-35. Tina told Andy to stay in a hotel that night and get the other half
the next day. R1835. But the next day, the supplier would not answer the
phone. R1838. Meanwhile, Tina was calling and saying that her buyer was
waiting at her house and that Andy needed to “hurry up.” R1841. In the midst
of all this, Andy picked up Cleat. R1837.
When Cleat learned of Andy’s predicament, he offered to help—he
said he could get enough meth to fill the order, but it would be more
expensive. R1841. Because Tina was in such a hurry, Andy gave Cleat the
rental car and some money and “just told him to go get” the meth. R1841-42.
Cleat left, but did not immediately return. After a couple of hours, Cleat
stopped answering the phone, and Andy stopped answering Tina’s calls and
texts. R1843.
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Eventually, Andy called Tina for a ride, and she and her buyer went to
pick him up and take him to Tina’s house. R1844-46. On the way, Andy “told
her what was going on” and why he had “let Cleat take the car and go pick
up the other half of the dope.” R1846. Once at the house, the three met up
with TJ—Tina’s boyfriend—who drove them around some more looking for
Cleat and the rental car. R1847-48; SE 10-12 (TJ’s truck). They were
unsuccessful, and went back to Tina’s house. R1848; SE1, 65-67. At this point,
Tina was getting “a little stressed out” about the potential loss of her rental
car, money, and drugs, and said she was “tired of people ripping her off.”
R1848-49.
Andy and Tina went into Tina’s garage to smoke and keep trying to
contact Cleat. R1849-51. After about half an hour, they “heard a truck pull up
and heard the door shut.” R1852. Tina said, “we need to figure this out
because Chris [Leech] [is] here and he [is] going to freak out.” Id.3
And freak out he did. Leech came into the garage, “pulled out a gun,”
pointed it at Andy, and asked “what the problem was.” R1852-54. Andy said
that he was “taking care of it” and that Cleat would get the meth. R1853.
Leech said that “it didn’t seem like [Andy] was taking care of shit,” and that

3

Leech was dating Tina’s sister, Teresa. R2109.
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he’d “better” do so or “it was [Andy’s] ass.” Id. From that point on, Andy was
a prisoner—they posted an armed guard (“Asian Tony”) to keep him in the
garage, and took away his cell phone. R1855-56, 1861, 2066; SE2-6, 60-64.
In the meantime, Tina and Chris Clyde continued to search for Cleat.
They went to Cleat’s house, where he lived with Tawnie Gallegos. R2034-37.
Tina told Tawnie that they needed her help to find Cleat “because he did
something really bad.” R2037-39. Tawnie went with them to Tina’s house.
R1849, 2039; SE64-67.
At Tina’s house they found Tina’s mother, Susan; TJ (the “Indian guy”);
Tina’s sister, Teresa; Leech; Tina’s buyer (the “white guy” from the Uintah
basin); Asian Tony, and Andy. R1845, 1867; 2041-42, 2066, 2107-10; SE82
(Juice), 83 (Tina), 84 (TJ). At some point, Tina’s sister Dawnie and her thenhusband Juice showed up. R1862.
Throughout the ordeal, Leech was in charge—“the one who told
everybody what to do.” R2138; see also R2198-99. When Andy tried to leave
the garage, Leech ordered him back inside and TJ shoved him back at
gunpoint. R2045-46. Leech was “mad” and said that he could not “wait until
he finds Cleat,” that he would make Cleat and Andy “pay for what they did,”
and that “he was going to shoot Andy and Cleat” “[b]ecause what they took
from Tina.” R2047. Leech’s compatriots agreed. Id.
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But that’s not what they told Cleat. After a few hours, Cleat called
Leech’s phone. R1865, 2125. Leech handed the phone to Juice, and had him
tell Cleat that “if he brought the car right now, . . . he gave his word nothing
would happen.” R2125-26. They agreed to meet at an apartment belonging to
Tina’s uncle, Gregorio Chavez (Uncle Chris). R1865, 1870-72, 2051, 2178;
SE68-71. Leech went to the garage and told Andy that they were “going
somewhere else.” R1867. Leech, TJ, and Juice escorted Andy to TJ’s truck, and
the group—minus Chris Clyde, Tawnie, Susan, and the buyer—went to
Uncle Chris’s. R1867, 1871-72, 2152-53, 2180.4 Once there, Leech, TJ, and Juice
took Andy inside and put him on the couch to wait for Cleat. R1870-71.
Just before Cleat arrived, Leech told Andy to lay down on the floor.
R1872-73. Leech emptied Andy’s pockets and took away his shoes. R1873-74.
Leech told TJ to get something to tie Andy and Cleat up with; TJ fetched some
speaker wire from his truck and tied Andy’s hands behind his back. R1874,
2131-32, 2190. At about that moment, Cleat arrived and handed over the
drugs, saying that “It’s all there.” R1875. Leech replied, “It’s too late for all

At one point in Andy’s testimony, the transcript says that “Tawnie”
showed up with Tina. But it is clear from Andy’s other testimony, as well as
Uncle Chris’s and Dawnie’s, that he must have said “Dawnie,” which was
mistranscribed as the near-homophone “Tawnie.” See R1872, 2118, 2180.
Tawnie had left Tina’s house with Chris Clyde. R2053.
4
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that,” put Cleat on the floor next to Andy. Id. Leech went through Cleat’s
pockets and TJ tied up his hands. R1876-77, 2132, 2134-35. Cleat continued to
plead: “[T]he car is there. The dope is there. Don’t got to do this.” R1876; see
also R2187. Leech refused: “It’s too late for all that shit.” R1876. Tina asked
Leech to spare Andy, who she considered “like [a] brother.”; Leech persisted:
“It’s too late now, I’m going to show everybody . . . how this is fucking done.”
R2189.
Both Cleat and Andy were wearing hooded sweatshirts. R1879; SE40,
41, 49, 85). Leech cut a hole in the hoods and tied the hoods to the front
zippers in a way that effectively blindfolded them. R1877-80, 2133, 2136; SE
85. Leech then ordered Juice or TJ to get Andy and Cleat into TJ’s truck.
R1883. TJ drove as Leech directed him up the canyon to Snowbasin resort.
R1885; 2282-83. During the drive, Cleat begged Leech to let him and Andy go
and promised that they “wouldn’t say anything.” R1886. Leech told him to
“Shut the fuck up, it’s too late.” Id. Andy thought, “this was going to end
badly . . . we were both going to be dead.” Id.
After what to Andy “seem[ed] like forever,” the truck came to a stop
on a dirt road that he thought must be in “the middle of nowhere.” R1887-88;
SE72-73. Leech took out Cleat and told Juice to take Andy out of the truck.
R1888. They escorted Andy and Cleat—who were shoeless—over “dirt and
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ice,” past a gate and down a hill. R1889-91. When they reached a small
embankment, they sat Andy and Cleat next to each other and cut open their
hoods. R1891. Cleat looked at Andy and said, “Sorry, bro, I guess this is it.”
R1896. Leech then shot him in the back, and Cleat rolled down the
embankment, saying, “I’m dead.” R1896-98.
Andy tensed up for what he thought would be his end. R1898. But the
end did not come. Instead, someone cut his hands loose. R1898-99. Leech then
grabbed him by the back of his hoodie, stood him up, and said, “There is your
homeboy”; “Now you got a choice. You can either finish him or you’re next.”
R1889, 2004. After some deliberation, Andy said, “All right.” R1900; see also
R2004. Leech took the clip out of the gun and handed it to Andy while putting
another gun to the back of Andy’s head and telling him not to “get any stupid
ideas.” Id. Because the clip was out, there was “just one bullet” in the gun.
R1901. Andy pointed the gun at Cleat and pulled the trigger; it jammed. Id.
Andy said he “wasn’t playing games” and said it wouldn’t fire. Id. Leech took
the gun back, reloaded it with a single bullet, and reset the scene. R1901-02.
When Andy pulled the trigger this time, the shot went off. R1902.
***
Police found Cleat’s body about a month and a half later. R2283-84;
SE23-27, 43-45, 72-73. To get to it, they parked on a dirt road, passed through
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a gate, went down a hill, and walked down a small embankment. SE14-16,
19-20, 43. Cleat was shoeless, was wearing a hoodie with a hole in the hood,
and had speaker wire tied to his wrists. R2233-36; SE38-39, 40-42, 49, 54, 85.
He was shot from more than two feet away, and had injuries consistent with
being in a seated position. R2240, 2257.
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court.
Charges. The State charged Leech with aggravated murder, two counts
of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count
of obstructing justice. R403-07.
TJ testifies at preliminary hearing. The magistrate held a two-day joint
preliminary hearing against Tina, Juice, and Leech. R116-20, 826-1621. During
the hearing, Leech’s counsel cross-examined as if it would be his only
opportunity to do so. See R938-39 (“Well, just so the . . . record’s clear . . . , I
mean, this is, you know, as so often happens in these cases, people tend not
to show up and . . . this may be our only opportunity to cross-examine this
witness.” . . . “[W]e have to explore these kinds of things with all witnesses,
but especially in a case like this.”).
TJ struck a deal with the prosecution and testified as a State’s witness
at preliminary hearing. R565-724. After his direct testimony, counsel for the
three defendants cross-examined him for almost an hour and a half, with
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Leech’s counsel doing the bulk of the questioning. See R119 (time stamps);
R633-49, 722-23 (cross by Tina’s counsel); R649-702 (cross by Leech’s counsel);
R702-18, 723-24 (cross by Juice’s counsel). The court did not limit counsel’s
cross of TJ in any way, and counsel covered the terms of TJ’s deal with the
prosecution, the crime circumstances, inconsistencies with other witnesses’
accounts, TJ’s drug use that night, his involvement in drug sales, his role in
the crimes, and his failure to go to police. R1323-1408.
TJ refuses to testify on the eve of trial. The week leading up to trial, TJ
wanted to renegotiate his deal, but the prosecutor was not willing to meet his
new demands. R1626-30. The prosecutor told the court that he intended to
call TJ at trial—he could either testify under his agreement, or, if he refused,
the prosecutor would grant him use immunity and ask the Court to order
him to testify. R1631. If he persisted in a refusal despite a contempt order, the
State would seek to admit his preliminary hearing testimony under rule 804.
Id.
The next day, TJ informed the court and counsel that he was not going
to testify. R1643-44. The Court suggested that the prosecutor could establish
unavailability by calling TJ at trial and establishing his unwillingness to
testify; the parties agreed. R1644. The prosecutor had previously informed
the court that this should not take place in front of the jury. R1630.
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The court admits TJ’s preliminary hearing testimony after hearing his refusal
outside the jury’s presence. Between jury selection and opening statements, the
prosecutor called TJ outside the jury’s presence. R1758. TJ purported to
invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and the
prosecutor explained to him that he had been granted use immunity. R1759.
The Court told TJ that if he didn’t testify under the immunity grant, he would
be held in contempt; TJ persisted, despite the court’s order to testify. R176061, 2348.
Defense counsel argued that TJ’s preliminary hearing testimony was
inadmissible because counsel’s motive to cross-examine was different at trial
than at prelimary hearing because he could not challenge TJ’s credibility to
the same extent in that hearing as he could at trial. R1763-64. In particular,
counsel noted that TJ was not asked at the preliminary hearing about
differences between his prior statements. R1764, 1767, 1769. When the court
asked if the magistrate forbade any questions of TJ, counsel acknowledged
that he “did not pose a question that was objected to and . . . sustained.”
R1766.
The court found TJ unavailable and admitted his preliminary hearing
testimony. R1786-87. Defense counsel later asked that TJ’s refusal to testify
should take place in front of the jury, so the jurors could have an impression
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of his credibility. R2341-42. The trial court denied this request, noting that this
would be mere “theatrics.” R2342, 2349.
Despite a last-ditch attempt by TJ’s counsel to exclude the testimony as
statements made during plea negotiations, R2385-93, a prosecutor took the
stand and read TJ’s testimony into the record. R2393-96.
Defense counsel forgoes introducing further impeachment of TJ’s testimony,
but gets a limiting instruction. Defense counsel later sought to introduce TJ’s
alleged prior inconsistent statements from (1) his testimony at Juice’s trial and
(2) a diagram that he had previously drawn—presumably, of the murder.
R2350, 2483, 2489. Though the prosecutor objected, the trial court ruled that
inconsistent statements would come in after a hearing at which the court
would decide whether certain statements were inconsistent or not. R24992500. The court proposed having the narrating prosecutor re-take the stand
to introduce the prior statements; defense counsel said he “would like that.”
R2500. But after “much discussion” with Leech, defense counsel ultimately
decided not to admit TJ’s prior inconsistent statements. R2563.
At the defense’s request, the trial court instructed the jury that “in this
case the testimony of a witness from a prior hearing was presented by the
State. Since the testimony of a person who is now unavailable was recited
from a prior hearing, you were not able to see or hear the actual person that
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provided that testimony.” R2569. The court continued, “You are further
instructed that credibility of a witness may in part be determined by
observing the manner in which the actual person testifies at trial, not merely
by their testimony.” Id.5
In closing, defense counsel said that the jury “didn’t get a chance” to
see TJ answering questions or to “watch his body language and how he
responded,” and that the court told them that “that’s important” to consider.
R2648.
Verdict and sentencing. The jury convicted Leech as charged, with nine
aggravators for aggravated murder and two sentencing enhancements.
R2696, 743-48. The court sentenced Leech to consecutive terms on the
aggravated murder count and one aggravated kidnapping count, with
concurrent terms on all the rest. R805. Leech timely appealed to the Utah
Supreme Court, which transferred the case to this Court. R809-14, 822-25.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Though the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness
at trial will often not be admissible, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Goins

The court, however, refused a defense instruction stating that the jury
was “entitled to give whatever weight deemed appropriate or draw any
inference they feel [was] warranted” from TJ’s refusal to testify despite a
court order. R2566-67.
5
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left open the possibility that defense counsel in a rare case could have a
sufficiently similar motive to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing that the
testimony could be admissible at trial under rule 804 if the witness became
unavailable. That was the case here—defense counsel said he had a motive to
cross-examine as if it would be his only opportunity, he was not limited in
what he could ask TJ, and he was cross-examined for nearly an hour and a
half. Under these circumstances, TJ’s testimony was admissible under rule
804. But even if the trial court erred in admitting the testimony, the error was
harmless, because TJ did not add all that much to the existing evidence.

ARGUMENT
I.
The unavailable witness’s preliminary hearing
testimony was admissible at trial because defense
counsel had similar motives to cross-examine and
extensively questioned him.
Leech’s sole claim is that the trial court erred by admitting TJ’s
preliminary hearing testimony at trial because his counsel did not have a
prior opportunity or similar motive to cross-examine TJ at that hearing.
Aplt.Br. 35-36; see Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(1); State v. Goins, 2017 UT 61, 423 P.3d
1236. Leech is mistaken. True, State v. Goins makes admitting preliminary
hearing testimony at trial the exception rather than the rule. But this is an
exceptional case, because counsel knew—under the law in effect at the time—
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that it could be his one chance to cross-examine, and extensively crossexamined TJ. In any event, even if the testimony was wrongly admitted, any
error was harmless because of the other overwhelming evidence of Leech’s
guilt.
A. The hearsay exception for former testimony ensures that a
witness’s unavailability does not foreclose admitting reliable
evidence.
Since at least the late 17th century, it has been “a hallmark of AngloAmerican evidence law that hearsay is ordinarily inadmissible.” Christopher
B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, vol. 4, § 8:2, 26 (2013)
(Mueller & Kirkpatrick); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44-46
(2004) (discussing common law changes to hearsay and confrontation
following treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh). But it has been no less a
hallmark of Anglo-American law to provide exceptions to general rules, and
no evidence rule has more exceptions than the rule against hearsay.
The many hearsay exceptions are justified primarily on reliability.
Though hearsay is excludable precisely “because it is considered generally
less reliable than live testimony,” the exceptions exist because the
circumstances under which some statements are made impart sufficient
reliability to entrust factfinders with considering them. Mueller & Kirkpatrick
at vol. 4, § 8:3, 28, 33; see also Battle ex rel. Battle v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport, 228
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F.3d 544, 552 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining former testimony admissibility
requirements reflect the “narrow concerns of ensuring the reliability of
evidence admitted at trial”) (cleaned up).
At issue here is the former-testimony exception. Witnesses become
unavailable for many reasons—they fall ill, die, disappear, or simply stop
cooperating. See, e.g., State v. Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶2, 417 P.3d 86 (discussing
possibility of illness rendering witness unavailable); Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895) (explaining that two witness at prior trial died before
new trial); Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶¶10-14 (explaining that State could not locate
homeless victim who disappeared before trial); State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App
245, ¶6, 314 P.3d 1014 (explaining that domestic violence victim became
uncooperative and refused to testify).6 When a witness that has previously
testified becomes unavailable—through no fault of either party—the
factfinder should not be deprived of that testimony, provided it is sufficiently
reliable. Cf. Mueller & Kirkpatrick at vol. 5, § 8:117, 77-78 (explaining that
former testimony exception exists out of “necessity”).

Mattox was decided under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause, not a federal rule of evidence; even so, its reasoning sheds light on
the necessity and fairness underlying admission of former testimony.
6
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Rule 804(b)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence lays out the requirements
which, if met, render former testimony reliable enough to be admitted at a
later trial: (1) “the declarant is unavailable as a witness”; (2) the testimony
“was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether
given during the current proceeding or a different one”; and (3) it is “offered
against a party who had . . . an opportunity and similar motive to develop it
by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.”7 Only the third is at issue here.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this element in Goins. In a previous
case, State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), the court had held that defense
counsel’s “motive and interest” under the former- testimony exception were
the same at both preliminary hearing and trial: “establishing the innocence of
his client.” Id. at 541. Under Brooks, so long as the preliminary hearing
involved live testimony, that testimony was per se admissible at trial if the
witness became unavailable. But based on later amendments to the Utah

At common law, the proponent of admitting former testimony “had
to establish a substantial identity of issue between the two hearings.” R. Collin
Mangrum & Hon. Dee Benson, Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence, vol. 1,
914 (2017-18 ed.) (emphasis added). But under “modern rules, the
requirement has been liberalized to require only a similarity of interest.” Id.
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 326 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Because ‘similar motive’ does not mean
‘identical motive,’ the similar-motive inquiry, in my view, is inherently a
factual inquiry, depending in part of the similarity of the underlying issues
and on the context of the . . . questioning.”).
7
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Constitution restricting preliminary hearings to the issue of probable cause,
the Goins court held that “the blanket statement” of similar interest “no longer
[rang] true,” and overruled Brooks. Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶32.
Goins asked the court “to not only disavow” Brooks, “but to replace it
with another blanket rule—one that provides that counsel never has the same
motive to develop testimony at a preliminary hearing as at trial.” Id. at ¶35
(emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court declined that invitation,
adopting a case-by-case approach. It explained that Goins’s proposed brightline rule would foreclose the possibility of “circumstances where the nature
of the case, or the testimony of the unavailable witness, is such that defense
counsel really did possess the same motive and was permitted a full
opportunity for cross-examination at the preliminary hearing.” Id. at ¶36. The
supreme court acknowledged that such cases “might prove rare,” but that it
could “envision” them. Id.
In support of this approach, the supreme court cited two cases:
Rodriguez v. State, 711 P.2d 410 (Wyo. 1985) and State v. Ricks, 840 P.2d 400
(Idaho Ct. App. 1992). Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶37. In Rodriguez, a witness testified
at a preliminary hearing and was “extensive[ly]” cross-examined by defense
counsel. 711 P.2d at 412. A few days before trial, she died. Id. The
admissibility of that testimony at trial turned on whether Rodriguez’s motive
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to cross-examine was similar at both hearings. Id. at 413. The Wyoming court
explained that the states approached the question in three ways: (1) that
motive is always the same; (2) that motive is never the same; and (3) that
motive is a case-by-case inquiry. Id. In adopting and applying the third
approach, the Wyoming court noted that the motive in the Rodriguez case was
the same because counsel’s “extensive cross-examination” showed that he
“was motivated to attack” the witness’s identification of his client, and did
so. Id. at 414.
In Ricks, the defendant was charged with possessing cocaine. 840 P.2d
at 401. The arresting officer—the only witness to the crime—testified at a
preliminary hearing, but was killed two days later. Id. at 401-02. In deciding
the motive question, the Idaho court considered several factors: (1) the type
of prior proceeding; (2) counsel’s trial strategy, including the purposes of the
cross-examination; (3) potential penalties or financial stakes in the prior
proceeding; (4) the issues and parties; and (5) whether, under the
circumstances, “a thorough cross-examination of declarant by the party
would have been reasonably expected in the former proceeding.” Id. at 40708 (cleaned up).
The Idaho court explained that though “the standard of proof is
obviously different” between preliminary hearing and trial, the factual
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elements, relationships between the parties, and the proceeding were
“exactly the same.” Id. at 408. Further, the defense motive on both occasions
was to attack the foundation for the officer’s testimony, his competency, and
his compliance (or lack thereof) with police procedure. Id. at 409. Even though
defense counsel “did not extensively cross-examine the officer” at
preliminary hearing, the court held that, on balance, the deceased officer’s
testimony was admissible. Id.
Thus, relevant factors under the “similar motive” inquiry can include:
the type of prior proceeding; trial counsel’s strategy; the issues, stakes, and
parties in the prior litigation; and the extent and purposes of crossexamination.
B. The unavailable witness’s preliminary hearing testimony here
was reliable because it met the former-testimony exception’s
requirements.
Considering those factors here, TJ’s testimony was admissible. Defense
counsel candidly told the trial court what his motive was—a full crossexamination of each witness. R938-39 (“Well, just so the . . . record’s clear, I
mean, this is, you know, as so often happens in these cases, people tend not
to show up and . . . this may be our only opportunity to cross-examine this
witness. . . . [W]e have to explore these kinds of things with all witnesses, but
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especially in a case like this.”). This was in keeping with the law at the time.8
Counsel also acknowledged that he cross-examined TJ without objection.9
R1766 (counsel acknowledging that he “did not pose a question that was
objected to and . . . sustained” during TJ’s testimony).
And counsel not only had the opportunity to cross-examine, he took
full advantage of it. See State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986)
(explaining, under Confrontation Clause, that even where a defendant “may
have elected to forgo cross-examination” that “does not mean that the
opportunity was not available.”). Counsel’s cross-examination of TJ lasted
more than an hour, and was supplemented by an additional half hour of codefense counsel’s cross. R119. TJ’s total cross-examination spans some eightyfive transcript pages. R633-49, 649-718, 722-24.

The preliminary hearing was held in July 2014, R826; the supreme
court decided Goins in September 2016.
8

That’s not to say that the defense had entirely free rein to crossexamine at the hearing—at one point, counsel was not permitted to explore
Tawnie’s lifetime drug use as much as he would have liked. See R937-38. But
he was able to ask about Tawnie’s drug use that would have affected her
ability to perceive and recall events. R938. And it is not clear that more remote
drug use would be admissible to impeach her at any rate. Cf. State v. Swain,
921 A.2d 712, 722-23 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that more-than-a-decadeold drug conviction excludable, despite defendant’s desire to show that
witness’s “memory and ability to recall may be hampered by a lifetime of
drug use”). But again, the court imposed no limitations on cross-examination
of TJ, and the sheer volume of questions shows a similar motive under rule
804.
9
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Given counsel’s mindset, the law in effect at the time, the lack of
limitations, and the sheer volume of questions, defense counsel possessed a
similar motive and had a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine TJ at the
preliminary hearing. This testimony was admissible at trial once he became
unavailable. See Rodriguez, 711 P.2d at 414; Ricks, 840 P.2d at 408-09; see also
United States v. Poland, 659 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding admissible prior
testimony from suppression hearing where counsel had a “strong motive” to
attack prior identification); United States v. Allen, 409 F.2d 611, 613 (10th Cir.
1969) (holding preliminary hearing testimony of unavailable witness
admissible where witnesses subject to “extensive cross-examination”); United
States v. Carneglia, 256 F.R.D. 366, 374-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding admissible
prior preliminary hearing testimony of unavailable witness where prior
counsel had “a substantial interest in challenging” that witness’s version of
events); Bland v. State, 4 P.3d 702, 722-23 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (holding
preliminary hearing testimony of unavailable witness admissible, “[d]espite
the difference in the burden of proof requirements”).
Leech’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. He asserts that
Goins held that “rule 804 precludes, as a matter of law, the admission of
preliminary hearing testimony at trial.” Aplt.Br. 37-38. But as explained,
Goins did not adopt a per se rule; it adopted a case-by-case rule. Leech also
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argues that defense counsel self-limited his cross-examination because of the
nature of preliminary hearings. Id. at 41. But as shown, counsel was
motivated to, and did in fact, extensively cross-examine TJ. TJ’s preliminary
hearing testimony was admissible under rule 804(b)(1).
C. Even if the preliminary hearing testimony were inadmissible,
admitting it would have been harmless error.
Even if the trial court erred in admitting TJ’s preliminary hearing
testimony, any error would have been harmless. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a)
(“Any error . . . which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded.”). Evidentiary errors are harmless if in their absence, there is no
reasonable likelihood of a different result. See Ellis, 2018 UT 2. This analysis
is “counterfactual”; an appellate court considers a “hypothetical” universe
“in which the trial went off without the error.” Id. at ¶42. That analysis is not
difficult here. Without TJ’s testimony, the State presented nearly identical
facts on the robberies and kidnappings through Andy, Tawnie, Dawnie, and
Uncle Chris. Tawnie corroborated Leech’s intent to kill Cleat, and the
physical evidence corroborated Andy’s account of the murder. The consistent
narrative from all three was that Leech was upset on Tina’s behalf, schemed
to get Andy and Cleat together and teach them a lesson, and directed the
robberies, kidnappings, and murder.
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And further on the murder, even if Leech had not pulled the trigger,
he still would have been liable as an accomplice. The jury was instructed on
each count that he acted as a “party to the offense,” and given the definition
of accomplice liability. R744-88, 772. So TJ’s account of the shooting itself—
while it did corroborate Andy’s testimony—did not add all that much, given
the overwhelming evidence of Leech’s intent to kill and directing the crimes.
Further, given that the jury found that he acted in concert with two or more
persons in covering up the crimes, R748, they must have believed that he
acted in concert with TJ and Juice in committing the crimes, given the
complete absence of any evidence supporting another narrative.
Finally, to show just how cumulative TJ’s testimony was, the State’s
recitation of the facts at the beginning of this brief does not contain a single
reference to TJ’s testimony. Under these circumstances, the absence of TJ’s
testimony would not reasonably have affected the result at trial. See, e.g., State
v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 1989) (holding erroneously admitted
testimony harmless where “merely cumulative” of victim’s testimony).
Leech argues otherwise, but not convincingly. First, he says that he was
unable to undermine TJ’s credibility. Aplt.Br. 45. But that is simply untrue—
the cross-examination at preliminary hearing included evidence of TJ’s deal
with the prosecution, the circumstances of the murder, a re-tread of TJ’s
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account of the night’s events, his use of drugs, the effects of those drugs on
his perceptions, his drug dealing, his disagreement with other testimony, his
failure to leave when he could have, his participation in the robberies,
kidnappings, and murder, and his failure to report what happened
afterward. R1323-1408, 1413-14. And counsel declined at trial to further
impeach TJ’s account with other statements he had given. See R2350, 2483,
2489, 2499-2500, 2563. That he was unwilling to present further evidence does
not mean that he was unable to do so.10
Leech next says that he suffered prejudice because the jury could not
observe TJ’s demeanor. Aplt.Br. 44-46. But the lack of demeanor evidence
does not show prejudice; rather, it is the reason for classifying former
testimony as hearsay and requiring the proponent to meet the reliability
requirements of rule 804(b)(2). See Mueller & Kirkpatrick, vol. 5 at 78 (“It is

Leech alleges that counsel attempted to “mitigate some of the
prejudice” by trying to call TJ in front of the jury, which he asserts counsel
was entitled to do. Aplt.Br. 46-47. But he does not separately argue against
this ruling, pressing it only as evidence of prejudice from the trial court’s
former-testimony ruling. Id. Alleged inability to mitigate prejudice does not
show prejudice.
10

Even had counsel been able to call TJ in front of the jury, it would have
made no difference to his credibility; it merely would have shown that he did
not want to testify. And if the reasons behind his refusal were fair game, then
the prosecutor could have shown that TJ was merely holding out for a better
plea deal. R1626-30.
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the very absence of demeanor evidence . . . that most sharply distinguishes
former testimony from live testimony. Of course this difference justifies
treating former testimony as hearsay, and admitting it only when the
conditions of the exception are satisfied.”); see also Allen, 409 F.2d at 613
(explaining that demeanor evidence cannot be “controlling factor,” or former
testimony would never be admissible in transcript form); cf. Mattox, 156 U.S.
at 243 (explaining, under Confrontation Clause, that admitting former
testimony “deprive[s]” defendants of demeanor evidence, but noting that
public policy and necessity dictated “that the rights of the public shall not be
wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the
accused”).
Leech asserts that without TJ’s testimony, “the jury was left with the
testimony of Andy,” Tawnie, Dawnie, and Uncle Chris, “all of [whom]
conflicted on every key point in the evidence.” Aplt.Br. 46. To the contrary,
aside from some minor details, their narratives combine to tell a consistent
story—Tawnie confirmed that Leech was upset with Andy and Cleat; that
Leech was the leader, giving orders to TJ and Juice; that Leech said he would
shoot Andy and Cleat; and that Leech held Andy hostage in the garage at
Tina’s house. R2045-56. Dawnie confirmed that once at Uncle Chris’s house,
Leech, Juice, and TJ robbed Andy and Cleat at gunpoint, tied them up, and
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took them away in TJ’s truck. R2124-39. Uncle Chris corroborated that Leech
was in charge, pulled a gun on Cleat and Andy, had TJ tie them up, emptied
their pockets, tied their hoodies shut, and walked them out of his apartment.
R2187-92, 2199.
And again, while it is true that TJ’s testimony corroborated Andy’s
account of the murder itself, the physical evidence did that also—Cleat’s
hood and hands had been tied as Andy explained, Cleat had no shoes, he was
shot from an intermediate range, and his wounds were consistent with being
shot while in a seated position. R2233-36, 2240, 2257; SE38-39, 40-42, 49, 54,
85. And Tawnie corroborated Leech’s intent to kill. See R2047 (stating that
Leech “was going to shoot Andy and Cleat”). It is also true that many of the
witnesses were inconsistent with their prior statements and with other
witnesses on more minor points, and that they were all drug users and/or
dealers. But TJ and his statements were more of the same—sometimes
(apparently) inconsistent statements on minor points from a less-thanupstanding witness.
Leech next argues that the prejudice from TJ’s testimony was
“exacerbated” because it was read into the record by a prosecuting attorney,
Tad May. Aplt.Br. 47-48; R2393-94. But the jury did not know that Mr. May
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was a prosecutor; the court merely introduced him as “someone reading the
part of” TJ. R2395. This did not add to the prejudice calculation in the least.
Leech further argues that TJ’s testimony was prejudicial because the
prosecutor relied on it in his closing argument to corroborate several things:
the robbery and obstruction charges; where the speaker wire came from and
how it was used to tie up Andy and Cleat; that Leech was in charge; that
Leech and his accomplices stopped for gas; and Leech’s shooting Cleat.
Aplt.Br. 48-50. Three of these points—the robbery, the speaker wire/tying,
and Leech’s being in charge—were cumulative of Tawnie’s, Dawnie’s, and
Uncle Chris’s testimonies, which does not show prejudice. See R2045-56,
R2124-39. Tawnie also corroborated that Leech intended to shoot both Andy
and Cleat, making TJ’s corroboration less impactful. R2047. To the extent that
the prosecutor used TJ’s testimony to corroborate the gas stop, this was mere
narrative unconnected to the crimes. Finally, using TJ’s testimony to
corroborate Andy on the obstruction charge added little to the overall
evidentiary picture. The thrust of the obstruction testimony was to prove that
Leech was still in charge after the murder, since four witnesses had agreed
that he was in charge leading up to the murder. That he would retain his
position afterward and direct the cover-up would come as no surprise.
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Leech also asserts that he was prejudiced by the admission of TJ’s
testimony because he was not able to get a continuance to deal with TJ’s lastminute refusal to testify. Aplt.Br. 50-53.11 But Leech does not explain exactly
what counsel would have done with more time. Counsel himself was not
entirely clear. See R1772—73 (counsel saying that if he had known TJ was not
going to testify, he might have done “a lot of things”). If the extra time was
to find and use additional impeachment evidence, counsel was later clear that
he had it and intended to use it, and the court was inclined to let him, but he
declined to do so. See R2350, 2483, 2489, 2499-2500, 2563. It was Leech’s choice
not to use that evidence, and had nothing to do with the denial of the
continuance. To the extent counsel would have sought interlocutory review
on the admissibility ruling, Aplt.Br. 53, that would be moot, as he raises the
same issue on direct appeal.
Finally, Leech claims prejudice because without TJ’s testimony, the
remaining evidence was inherently unreliable. Aplt.Br. 46, 53-54. This claim
is inadequately briefed, as it neither cites to nor applies the controlling law

To the extent this can be read as claiming independent harm from
the continuance denial, this claim is inadequately briefed. Though Leech cites
to a case with the right test for such claims, see Aplt.Br. 53 (citing State v.
Peraza, 2018 UT App 68, 872 Utah Adv. Rep. 12), he does not analyze the facts
of this case under that test. This cannot meet his burden of persuasion on
appeal. See Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶42.
11
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on this subject: State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, 210 P.3d 288, and State v. Prater,
2017 UT 13, 392 P.3d 398. See generally Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶42 (explaining
standards for and consequences of inadequate briefing). And he addresses
only Andy—he does not discuss Tawnie, Dawnie, Uncle Chris, or the
physical evidence. The inherent-unreliability analysis does not apply where,
as here, there is corroborating evidence. See Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶38. Because
Andy’s statements were corroborated by three other witnesses and the
physical evidence, TJ’s statements did not make much difference—if any—in
the result here.
II.
Leech has argued only a single error, so he cannot
show cumulative error.
Leech finally argues that this Court should reverse for cumulative
error, if nothing else. Aplt.Br. 54. But as shown, he has argued only a single
error at trial—the admission of TJ’s testimony. All of his other arguments
purportedly show prejudice from that ruling, not independent errors.
Because courts cannot cumulate prejudice from a single error, this Court
should affirm. See State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶48, 872 Utah
Adv. Rep. 51 (“[A] single . . . error cannot warrant reversal under the
cumulative error doctrine.”).
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CONCLUSION
Under the unique circumstances of this case, TJ’s preliminary hearing
testimony was admissible, and even if it were not, it was harmless given the
overwhelming evidence of Leech’s guilt. And because Leech has alleged only
a single error, he cannot show cumulative error. This Court should affirm.
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